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Tuesday, 26 June 2012

Heading for the exits

A Chinese dollar?
Adding to the confusion of the different types of Chinese currency (onshore and offshore Renminbi), and some of the unintended consequences discussed previously is an interesting idea noted by the Beyond Brics team from from Richard Harris at Port Shelter Investment Management.  Given that the non-transferable offshore Renminbi (CNH) sits alongside the domestic Hong Kong Dollar (which although transferable is limited by a longstanding US Dollar peg) Harris has suggested combining the two, to make a "Chinese dollar".  Some details and a hint of some of the benefits for capital flows are set out here.

Such a move could viewed as a reverse-merger of sorts (merging the offshore Chinese currency with its onshore, established equivalent).  Reverse mergers, which were used by many Chinese companies to combine with US listed shell companies and fast track equity listings in the US - were the subject of a number of scandals in recent years, and a new battle for transparency has opened up between US and Chinese regulators (more below).

Fraud of the week
Last week, China focused US research firm Citron Research, caused a storm when it issued a strong research report condemning alleged fraudulent practices at Evergrande, a top Chinese property developer, (link here). In a similar manner to the Sinoforest debacle, the company's management responded to the release of the report and subsequent rapid stock decline with aggressive denials and Evergrande enlisted a number of its investment banks for support.  Worringly, Marketwatch's Craig Stephen raised the question as to whether a threshold had been passed, so that from now on, larger and more established companies on the Chinese mainland (including Hong Kong listed) could be subject to claims of fraud and insolvency.

Unhelpfully greater transparency which could reassure markets does not seem to be forthcoming.  There have been reports of harrasment and detention of investigators which short sellers and others have been sending to verify Chinese companies' operations on the ground (who some companies and their advisers allege are trying to spread false information), while it has been reported that access to Chinese company filings (which short sellers made great use of to publish their reports) has been restricted.  As Patrick Chovanec of Tsinghua University sets out in an interesting blog post, it is not only that company documents are becoming harder to get, but that certain requests for information by the SEC and its affiliates in respect of Chinese companies which are listed in the US have been refused by the Chinese authorities.  And as he puts it there could be serious consequences if the stand-off continues:
By the end of this year, unless a compromise can be reached, there is a very real chance that U.S. securities regulators may end up employing the “nuclear option”:  forcibly delisting every Chinese company currently listed on a U.S. stock exchange — such as Sinopec, Sina.com, China Life, and China Unicom.   It’s a potential catastrophe-in-the-making that few investors or politicians have given any serious thought to.

Meanwhile...200 stories up
Before such a calamity may eventuate, it is quite possible that one Chinese company which has been attracting a lot of attention in the property and engineering sector, Broad Sustainable Building, may have built the world's tallest skyscraper.  Announced last week, the Sky City One Project (if approved) will involve the company, which is famous for prefabricating all parts of its buildings in a factory and joining the parts together on site, erecting a building taller than the Burj Khalifa of Dubai (the world's tallest building, which took 6 years) in just 90 days.

Of course like the Burj it could be interpreted as a sure sign that the Chinese economy is heading for severe recession (some research on the correlation between skyscraper construction and the onset of economic downturns is referred to here).  A recent video from Reuters helps illustrate just how many skyscrapers are being built in China (and how quickly).

Tracking capital flight
John Hempton, a notable China short analyst attracted a lot of attention the other week with his blog post declaring China to be a kleptocracy - "of a scale never seen before in human history".  While there have previously high estimates of the scale of corruption in China (one leaked internal PBOC report identified $120 billion of illegitimate funds transferred out of China by officials in the preceding 15 year period), more details about how money is being transferred out of China has emerged recently.

In addition to laundering through trips to Macau casinos, overseas real estate has been popular, both in Asian countries and as more recently noted, in the USVictor Shih, of Northwestern University has been a leading light in the study of capital flight from China, and he has noted the significant impact capital flight by the wealthiest 1% of households in the Chinese hierarchy could have.

What is interesting is the connection of instances of capital flight to political tensions between factions of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).  This report by Matt Gnaizda of NTDTV is a very helpful introduction to the Jiang and Hu Jintao factions in the CCP who are battling for prominence ahead of the expected accession of Xi Jinping to the presidency of China later this year.  Matt also mentions the connection of Bo Xilai, the recently ousted mayor of Chongqing to the Jiang faction.  Bo's wife Gu Kilai recently was reported to have admitted killing British businessman Neil Heywood to stop him disclosing the laundering of $6 billion and Bo's fate remains unknown at this time.

More broadly, the dismissal of Bo, itself a significant shift in the Chinese political landscape, may have triggered a rush of capital exits - this report from China's Forbidden News suggests increasing speed of transfers by members of the Jiang faction as the faction's position has become destabilised.  Countering this, it would seem is the recent introduction of new asset disclosure rules for top military officers (reportedly part of a Hu-led anti-corruption campaign).  This sort of maneuvering could continue for the duration of the year and its coincidence with destabilisation of the financial markets in China could be problematic.

China looks to introduce an effective anti-corruption fighter
Feedback
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Friday, 8 June 2012

Goodbye to BRICS?

The economies of the much talked-about BRICS countries are crumbling.  This was the headline in a post this week in the FT blog, Beyond Brics (which has these emerging economies as its focus).  Perhaps for the first time in a long while, disappointing economic news came out this week for each economy in the club first identified by Goldman Sachs' Jim O'Neill in 2001 (and formally launched in 2009).  For China, significant attention was paid to Thursday's unexpected interest rate cut by the central bank, the first since 2008.  Despite initial positive reactions, concerns were later raised that a) Chinese authorities would not have the scope to conduct loosening on the scale necessary or similar to the stimulus in 2008 (or if it did it could be detrimental) and b) that the rate cut may in fact have been driven by more serious concerns of slowdown which may be revealed by monthly production data, to be released this weekend.

Pumping in cash
Prior to the interest rate cut, the methods of stimulus were in focus with many concerned that some of the excesses of the 2008 stimulus be avoided.  Attention was paid to the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), a bureaucratic body which approves many large-scale development projects and had gone into overdrive in 2008/9.  Just how rapidly the NDRC rubber-stamped big ticket projects then was studied by Victor Shih (discussed in a forum last year, link here).  Meanwhile Victor noted on his twitter feed that the NDRC had also recently approved a "bad-ass project to artificially influence weather in NE China" (announcement here).

The NDRC has also approved several large steel projects, at a time when the sector is unprofitable.  As discussed with steel companies, the concern is not only that stimulus financing could be misallocated to inefficient projects which lose money (and result in increasing non-performing bank loans), but also that money provided (for bricks and mortar purposes) may be diverted into further lending and speculation.  Recent shorting of the stock of construction machinery maker Zoomlion (listed on the Shenzen and Hong Kong exchanges) has exposed the ingenuity of some operators with suggestions that even some of its concrete mixers may have been acquired to be used as collateral for further lending.

One development project which needs funding
Business as usual?
Meanwhile Chinese officials do seem to be seeking to assert more control over information in the financial sector.  Recent Wall Street Journal articles gave some interesting details about measures which have been viewed sceptically by foreign investors and regulators, including requirements for greater localisation of foreign accounting firms and a recent decision at one of the key repositories of data on Chinese companies, the State Administration of Industry and Commerce, to significantly restrict access to its records (which may have been related to the fact that these records were used by many of the foreign analysts who short-sold stocks of Chinese companies in the last 2 years).  In contrast, problems of oversight remain in the banking sector, where implementation of the Basel III banking reforms have been further delayed to commence in 2013 and the executive vice president of the Agricultural Bank of China (one of the large, listed pillar banks of the Chinese economy) was detained on corruption charges at the end of May.

Perspectives on the Chinese currency
As mentioned previously, a bit more coverage of the Chinese currency is overdue- a topic which can be a little confusing simply by the fact that it has several denominations (offshore/onshore) and two interchangeable titles in reports - Renminbi/yuan (with the latter being the unit of denomination) as well as the nickname of the "redback".  Until 2009, there was not much to say about the Renminbi except that it was in a fixed and then managed float, and was undervalued against the US dollar.  With US pressure and liberalisation measures, the value of the Renminbi has started to change recently.

Some background to note - one of the reasons China was reluctant to allow a flexible Renminbi rate was fear of "Plaza" - fear that the Renminbi could appreciate rapidly in the same manner as the Japanese Yen did after the coordinated action of central banks to devalue the US dollar in 1985 (pursuant to the Plaza Accord).  Many view the appreciation as a key causative factor in the asset bubble which triggered the collapse of the Japanese economy and the subsequent slow growth in the 1990's referred to as the "lost decade".  In China's case, the fear is that a rapid appreciation of the Renminbi (which could start upon a free float) could eat into China's export economy and threaten jobs and social harmony quite significantly.  From the US perspective, similar to 1985 position against the Yen, the undervalued Renminbi has been a key cause in the large US trade deficit with China and allowing it to float would cause an appreciation (and dollar depreciation) that would give a boost to US exporters and shrink the enormous imbalances with China (in particular the People's Republic's gargantuan holdings of US Treasuries).

While most commentators viewed a simple appreciation as neither feasible nor a solution, the policy background has become more complicated.  In particular:

i) Policy makers have favoured gradual liberalisation or "internationalisation" to diversify China's reserve holdings away from US dollars and to open up the Renminbi to use in international trade settlement and as an international reserve currency.  From 2009, measures were adopted to allow greater international use of the Renminbi, befitting China's status as a pre-eminent trading nation.  The sort of thinking underlying this move is outlined in a recent FT article.

b) A consequence of the measures which have resulted in greater circulation of the Renminbi is increasing complexity of Renminbi valuation.  In particular there are greater opportunities for capital flight and arbitrage between onshore and offshore Renminbi (including those involving stockpiled metal as collateral).  As this insightful Beyond Brics piece notes having looked at recent data from global payments network SWIFT one type of arbitrage that appears to be happening frequently is as follows:

A Chinese company places renminbi on deposit with a mainland bank, earning an interest rate of about 3.5 per cent. The company then obtains a long-dated, renminbi-denominated letter of credit from the bank, ostensibly to pay for a shipment of goods from its own subsidiary in Hong Kong.
In turn, the Hong Kong subsidiary takes the letter of credit to a local bank and uses it as collateral to obtain a US dollar loan at a lower interest rate than those available on the mainland. In many cases, the company would also use a currency derivative to eliminate the foreign exchange risk. The end result: the company has captured the difference between onshore and offshore interest rates, less banker’s fees.
and worringly:
If international trade in the renminbi is largely driven by financial arbitrage, as the extraordinary use of letters of credit implies, then Beijing’s plan to internationalise the renminbi is not exactly going according to plan.

Likewise all is not going according to plan in the offshore "dim sim" bond market where foreign companies issue bonds in Renminbi in Hong Kong (encouraging demand and use for the Renminbi denominated securities) - as noted in May, yields on dim sum bonds have been rising making it cheaper to raise finance in other currencies and markets.  And as mentioned previously, Victor Shih and others have found the impact of capital flight (on flows and valuation) by connected elites could be significant.

c) But perhaps, most significantly, the mechanism by which China recycled US dollar export earnings into reserves (and managed its currency flows domestically) is breaking down, primarily because of an export slowdown plus Europe fears and greater reluctance of exporters to settle their dollar deposits.  A detailed study out by Nomura is described here tracks the slowdown in the accumulation of dollar reserves.  The Nomura team conclude on one aspect - the slowing of the flood of US dollars gives the People's Bank of China more scope to act on monetary policy.  However, if this pattern is sustained, the other effect could be devaluation and/or a need to sell down reserves.  An ING note discussed yesterday concluded that signals to this effect were temporary but this may not be so.  Looking at April data:
The data reinforced fears that the economy was on a slippery slope to a hard landing via an overvalued currency and capital flight..
In the least the note did conclude that the Renminbi was overvalued at the moment (as did the IMF, in a shift from its recent position).  Perhaps a good concluding example of uncertainty with the Renminbi's prospects is seen in this article about a Renminbi deposit account offered by the Bank of China's New York branch.  Set up as part of the internationalisation so that foreigners can hold Renminbi, there is a question though whether they would wish to do so if there is a chance of devaluation?