China chaos and a new normal? A year in review

Since taking a break this time last year, China's markets and their ongoing story have exploded into international consciousness.  The dawning of not only several "black" trading days, but what was characterised as China's "1929" moment.  So it would be good to note a couple of charts and comparing the similarity of the main Chinese index, the Shanghai Composite (SHCOMP) and the tech index (ChiNext) with some of the greater stock crashes of the last century:

Comparison against 1929 crash (c) Zerohedge.com

Comparison against the Nasdaq 2000 crash (c) Investinginchinesestocks.blogspot.com

The desperation with with the Chinese authorities stemmed the losses was intense, including bans on selling, enormous purchases by Chinese SOEs and brokerage companies and of course, attacking "malicious" short-sellers both in China and internationally.  News site Quartz had a good summary of steps taken so far.  In addition as Reuters noted, China sought to exert its authority even outside its jurisdiction approaching Singapore and Hong Kong exchanges to request trading records.

As plenty of sensible commentators noted, the actions by the Chinese authorities are lunacy.  A market majority of shares suspended from trading and/or owned by a state rescue fund, in which participants cannot sell will not operate as a price discovery mechanism (which is the point of a stock market) and with renewed pressure as in Japan, such measures will fail anyway.  Bridgewater Associates, one of the world's largest hedge funds issued a memo reversing its favourable view of China (which they later sought to downplay), while large corporates revised their growth forecasts downwards.  Christopher Balding, an academic in China, explained some of the links between the stock market and the real economy in a blog post.  Investment Bank UBS with a sizeable interest in China business, posted a video of its analysts falling over themselves to try and rationalise why everything would probably just fine though.

Bankers looking concerned (c) UBS

Revisiting the 1990s

It goes without saying that China's efforts to "rebalance" away from its investment driven growth model are in tatters.  Not only are key foundations of the proposed rebalancing compromised (such as likelihood of the currency RMB revaluing, or the China - HK Stock Connect mechanism for outsiders to invest in Chinese shares) but the main thrust of the stock market push, the encouragement of middle-class Chinese to invest in the stock market has failed spectacularly and once again, Chinese savers have seen a transfer of their wealth (usually it is through means such as financial repression including via low interest rates).  Stories of complete losses by amateur investors have emerged, only weeks after the heavy involvement of unsophisticated individuals had been noted in the financial media.

It is worth noting that the aggressive promotion of the Chinese sharemarket by state media had taken place during 2015 in what many interpreted as an attempt to distract from the property market bubble (seen with the collapse of apartment-builder Kaisa earlier in 2015).  In short  a messy situation!

That said though one aspect not mentioned in the discussion about the current situation is China has shut one of its markets before.  It seemed relevant given the period when China shut its market before resuming state support.  And the lessons it serves are not positive.

Referred to as the "327 Incident" (in reference to the code of the Chinese government bond traded), the taking of a significantly losing position by a subsidiary of the Ministry Finance  (a centre of factional power for the Party in the Chinese financial system) in 1995 resulted in the cancellation of trading, the imposition of losses to the securities firm which held the correctly priced profitable position and the imprisonment of its head, and, the closure of the futures market for 18 years (remaining closed throughout the 1990s and only reopening recently).  A good summary below from the Beijing Review:

February 23, 1995 was the darkest day in China's securities history.

In 1992, China had issued 24 billion yuan ($3.6 billion) in Treasury bonds (T-bonds) coded "327" that were set to mature in June 1995.  Upon reaching maturity, the bonds were to be repaid with interest and discounts that reflected inflation.

Guan Jinsheng, then General Manager of the Wanguo Securities Co. Ltd. (Wanguo), expected inflation to dip and estimated that the 327 T-bonds with a par value of 100 yuan ($15) would be repaid at 132 yuan ($20). When the bond's market price hovered around 148 yuan ($22.3), Wanguo decided to hold a short position of the 327 T-bond contracts.

In striking contrast, the China Economic Development Co. Ltd., a wholly owned subsidiary of the Ministry of Finance (MOF), held a long position, expecting the government to raise the bond's discount rate.On February 23, 1995, the MOF announced that it would repay the bond at 148.5 yuan ($22.4).

This news pushed up the bond's price to 151.98 yuan ($22.9). In a desperate attempt to recoup its losses, Wanguo sold an astonishing 1.46 trillion yuan ($220 billion) worth of 327 T-bonds eight minutes before the market closed, dragging its price down to 147.4 yuan ($22.2).

But the SSE announced that the contract sales in the last eight minutes were invalid, leading to 5.6 billion yuan ($843.4 million) in losses for Wanguo.Because of the incident, Wei Wenyuan, then General Manager of SSE, was removed from office for a lack of regulation. Guan Jinsheng was imprisoned and Wanguo was merged into Shenyin Securities Co. Ltd.

If such an approach is followed this time around, then expect a lot more pain.

The reform legacy - Part II

Since the last post there have been a couple of articles which highlight quite well the importance of the reform debate and the main themes.  As the PBOC launched further stimulus (including via a new tool called "Pledged Supplementary Lending" involving 1 trillion yuan for new lending), James MacKintosh, Investment Editor of the Financial Times filmed an interesting presentation giving some context to the resulting rise in share prices. While ordinarily share prices would be indicative of higher confidence and expectations for growth, MacKintosh noted that the sectors which had shown the greatest share price increases (and saw the best response to stimulus measures) were companies in the banking, property and industrial sectors - all sectors which the Chinese authorities wanted to steer investment away from (and into other sectors) as part of the reform and rebalancing process.  Or as James put it:

 "a return to pre-crisis business as usual...a pause in reform means less risk in property and banking as well as the old line state-owned enterprises".

"China Property Gamble" (c) Financial Times

Of course what James didn't dwell on (but certainly implied) is that there would be more risk overall and in the medium to long term (hence the need for reform to reduce the risk, sadly not carried through).  Over at FTAlphaville, the suppression of risk was covered well in an article by David Keohane who noted falling bond yields, the bailing out of one trust which had been set to default and a pessimistic analysis from reputed analyst Diana Choyleva of Lombard Street Research who noted:

 ...But the more sinister explanation [of failure of domestic demand to drive economic growth] is that the authorities are unable to provide a significant boost to growth even if they want to. They may be trying to boost credit to SMEs, but demand for loans has come off again. China needs to clean up after its debt binge, not stoke it further. The current level of debt may just about mean that Beijing has a chance to reform successfully even if that will involve a few years of meagre growth and financial distress. But the ongoing rapid rate of increase in debt suggests that policymakers do not have too long to postpone much-needed defaults...

Zerohedge meanwhile has taken a much more vigorous editorial line and especially with the Qingdao commodity financing scandal (including discussion of a note from Goldman Sachs as to the impact from an unwinding of metal-based rehypothecation).  On the new stimulus measures and their indication of the slowdown in reforms, contributorTyler Durden is blunt:
 

So whatever way you look at it, the PBOC thinks China needs more credit (through one channel or another) to keep the ponzi alive. Anyone still harboring any belief in reform, rotation to consumerism is sadly mistaken. One day of illiquidity appears to have been enough to prove that they need to keep the pipes wide open. The question is where that hot money flows as they clamp down (or not) on external funding channels.

And also:

Simply put - you can kiss goodbye any hopes of China ceasing its exuberant credit creation... (especially now that the CCFD ponzi scheme has been exposed via Qingdao -and drastically reduced that channel). Reforms are all talk and the bubble will just grow bigger with fewer and fewer attractive outlets for that hot money (now that the US real estate transmission channel has been identified and likely closed)... cue real inflation.

From those Zerohedge articles are two charts of note, the first showing the total amount of credit (bank assets) in the Chinese economy and its rapid growth:

and the second the rise in rates which preceded the recent PBOC stimulus (after it apparently stopped conducting repo operations), which corresponds nicely with the increase in share prices mentioned before (imagine the effect on share prices if repo rates continue to rise and there is no new liquidity from the PBOC?!):

 

Finally, while it will still remain for the next post to discuss some summer reading about the history of reform in China, it can be added one extra piece of reading on exactly this point - a 2013 IMF Working Paper:  "China’s Path to Consumer-Based Growth: Reorienting Investment and Enhancing Efficiency" (here), which " proposes a possible framework for identifying excessive investment".

The reform legacy - Part I

One of the most significant debates of the moment is the extent to which China is engaging in reform away from the production-heavy, subsidised, export-orientated economy towards a more balanced, consumption-led, open and lower growth (but more sustainable) model.

This is the background amidst which debates such as regarding China's target rate of GDP growth and the internationalisation of the currency (the Renminbi) have occurred and there are plenty of opinions on offer.  A good example was seen at the conference organised by the Financial Times' offshoot FTAlphaville, where celebrity guests Michael Pettis and Carson Block offered differing visions - in a short interview Pettis noted that rebalancing was proceeding in a more or less predictable manner (with reforms proceeding as announced in the Third Plenum), while for Carson Block, an impending debt crisis would likely arrive sooner and cause enough trouble as to hinder any meaningful schedule of reform. 

As it happens Pettis has considered the issue of debt quite specifically and a recent post on his blog argues its importance in understanding China's growth prospects and in understanding rebalancing - a feature of one of his recent books.  A recording of Pettis speaking at the 2013 Wine Country Conference sets out the background in excellent detail and is a real eye opener - Pettis likens the Chinese economic model to that of Japan "on steroids".  There is an interesting contrast with Pettis' blog post - which concludes asking the question of where the great losses from the excessive debt will be recognised.  In the Wine Country presentation Pettis details how losses in Japan were absorbed by the government when it took on the debts of the banking system rather than overseeing writeoffs (in a manner similar to which European sovereigns today are taking on the risk of their bloated banking sectors).  It would seem likely that the same may occur in China, where corporate debt now has surpassed that of the US and is estimated to be 200% of GDP.

Leaning to the chaotic
As Pettis notes in his presentation and elsewhere rebalancing is inevitable from a macroeconomic point of view and amidst the choices available to economic decision-makers are a range of outcomes from orderly rebalancing to chaotic.  Recent news has suggested that (i) authorities in China are trying to delay rebalancing, through measures like the "mini-stimulus" (which will only worsen the outcome later on) and (ii) events on the ground may be starting to overwhelm the ability of the authorities to maintain control such that rebalancing will not be orderly.

The mini-stimulus was unveiled in April 2014 with announcements of new spending targeting SOEs and state-focussed industries, with results appearing to show increased production by mid June and into July.  So far as expected.  But in addition to wondering where the next round of growth is going to come from since the administration's mini-stimulus has delayed SOE reform and shifting of production to the private sector, several themes have emerged in the background which could undermine the whole process.  These are:

1.  The divergence between Government and Private Economics surveys
As this article on Zerohedge notes, essentially one of the teams producing the surveys is likely just making up the numbers since private surveys show economic stagnation while government produced statistics paint a rosy picture.

One set of statistics is likely to be false and if it is the government produced statistics then the state of the Chinese economy could be grave.

2.  The property market is imploding
Daily updates on the Investing in Chinese Stocks Blog are offering a disturbing picture of financial collapse across the country with nationwide price falls in properties for sale in cities across the country, developers launching all manner of tactics to clear sales targets and credit guarantee and other private financing firms seeing their directors flee owing creditors millions.  This is getting litte attention in the Western media although an article in Zerohedge (drawing from a Bloomberg article) provides a useful summary.

3.  The commodities finance trade has frozen up
Sophisticated China watchers will be aware of the holes in the great capital wall which have allowed capital to circulate through the Chinese economy and keep it functioning, including the remittance program which allowed wealthy Chinese to evade the limit on remittances and engage in massive capital flight by transferring funds out of China to buy real estate in developed markets like Canada, Australia and the US.  One method of effecting remittances was through a hidden program at certain banks which was the subject of an expose by CCTV, the State broadcaster.  Commentators noted that the expose may have been part of a factional battle taking place between factions aligned with CCTV and the PBOC (since the programs were approved), but of even more significance is the emergence of fraud in the commodities trade.

Also arising as part of a corruption investigation, charges of fraud at the large port of Qingdao by Decheng Mining, a metals trader which offered financing and rehypothecated metal stocks (using the same collateral for multiple loans, including using forged documents) is of note not only because of the size of fraud or that international banks have been involved, but that the whole commodity financing industry in China is under threat and that as such a significant amount of liquidity for the Chinese financial sector which the commodity financing provides could be at risk.  An interesting article refers to a recent failure of a letter of credit settlement - which does remind of failures of repo trades which presaged the Lehman collapse - which can only be understood as systemic.

The next blog will look at some interesting summer reading which traces the historic background that helped lead to the current situation, but until then here is a shot from a new Chinese water park which speaks to more than just the plight of the swimmers...

 

A belief in the supernatural

Following the last post it emerged that there are another class of investors already taking losses (and expect more of these to appear).  In perhaps what could be termed the ending of the Xiaochan put (a corollary of the Greenspan put, by which US markets had been supported by intervention by the Federal Reserve), so a report from Morgan Stanley detailed the vast sums wagered by speculators positioning for a continued rise in the Chinese currency (the Yuan/Renminbi) which came to an end as the Central Bank in China, the PBOC (led by Zhou Xiaochan) sought to stunt speculation in the currency:

The seemingly incessant strengthening trend of the Chinese Yuan (much as with the seemingly inexorable rise of US equities or home prices) has encouraged huge amounts of structured products to be created over the past few years enabling traders to position for more of the same in increasingly levered ways. That was all going great until the last few weeks which has seen China enter the currency wars (as we explained here). The problem, among many facing China, is that these structured products will face major losses and as Morgan Stanley warns "real pain will come if CNY stays above these levels," leading to further capital withdrawal, illiquidity, and a potential vicious circle as it appears the PBOC is trying to break the virtuous carry trade that has fueled so much of its bubble economy.

and losses were estimated to be in the billions of dollars, and worryingly (given the deterioration going on in the Chinese economy) many of the holders of the loss-making positions were Chinese corporates:

In their previous note, MS estimated that US$350 billion of TRF have been sold since the beginning of 2013. When we dig deeper, we think it is reasonable to assume that most of what was sold in 2013 has been knocked out (at the lower knock-outs), given the price action seen in 2013...."Given that, and given what business we’ve done in 2014 calendar year to date, we think a reasonable estimate is that US$150 billion of product remains."...

...The potential for US$4.8 billion in losses for every 0.1 above the average EKI could have significant implications for corporate China in its own right, as could the need to post collateral on positions even if the EKI level is not breached... 

On the latest check this trend seemed set to continue with weak economic statistics, regulatory concern and weakness in the currency all referenced in a Bloomberg report.  As mentioned in that report, the spectre of capital flight and further destabilisation of Chinese financial markets is a not shallow risk.
 
Hope and dreams
Notwithstanding some less than pleasing numbers and off-message disclosures of some key figures in China's dynamic property sector and prices of apartments starting to be discounted in a way described as "crumbling" (and here), the facade of the great China miracle continues for the time being, even with the recent announcement of a passing of the US on one economic measure (not without criticism, including from the Financial Times).
 
As an example of the continued hopefulness and ambition the recent report of an ultra-fast lift to be incorporated in a new development in Guangzhou is a reminder of the Middle Eastern style optimism which has driven the China urban development story.  Of course reality throws up questions such as the need for a giant financial centre development in somewhere like Guangzhou but the need to maintain a motivating ideology for the continued reckless and unsustainable growth seems still to be a concern of those in power and with commercial interests.
 
This was noted by my recent reading of modern Party mouthpiece China Daily whilst transiting at an airport, which dedicated an issue to President Xi's own notion of the "China Dream", a new guiding vision for youthful and emerging China (with the cover story "Dream Debate").  While well composed and quite glossy, the feature section was disappointing as it fell into predictable patterns, including:
 

• a piece by American China apologist Robert Kuhn, who earlier said that the Bo Xilai scandal was only of interest to Westerners because it was "salacious";
• an advocacy of the status quo by Zhou Feng that contained such wonderful statements as "drastic measures are not necessary" and

"by withstanding the global financial crisis in 2008-09, the Chinese economy has become more resilient in its ability to deal with slower growth. Its trade sector, for example, has become used to operating with wafer-thin profit margins."

(that would be resilience by going bankrupt!) 

• a wonderfully titled piece by Yu Yongding "No financial meltdown to worry about", which argues that China will be fine because it does not have US subprime mortgages (trust loan anyone?)

and so on.
 
Over at Zerohedge, hyperbole notwithstanding there was a far more grim picture being painted of the situation in China currently:
 

China is a case of bastardized socialism on credit steroids. At the turn of century it had $1 trillion of credit market debt outstanding—-a figure which has now soared to $25 trillion. The plain fact is that no economic system can remain stable and sustainable after undergoing a 25X debt expansion in a mere 14 years....

...The borrowing, building and speculating mania in China has obviously gotten so extreme that even the new regime in Beijing has been desperately trying to cool it down. But this will end up as a catastrophic failure—not the “soft landing” brayed about by Wall Street bulls who do not have the slightest comprehension of the difference between free market capitalism and the phony “red capitalism” that has been confected by the party-controlled apparatus of the massive, intrusive, bureaucratic and hierarchically-driven Chinese State..

At bottom the fatal error among China bulls is the failure to recognize that the colossal boom and bust cycle that China is undergoing is not symmetrical. The much admired alacrity by which the state guided the export boom after 1994 and the infrastructure boom after 2008 is not evidence of a superior model of governance; its only proof that when credit, favors,  subsidies, franchises and speculative windfall opportunities are being passed out freely and to everyone, when there are all winners and no losers ( e. g. China’s bankruptcy rate has been infinitesimal), a statist regime can appear to walk on water....

...In short, the Chinese population “can’t handle the truth” in Jack Nicholson’s memorable line. They by now believe they are entitled to a permanent feast and have every expectation that they party and state apparatus will continue to deliver it. As a result, Beijing has resorted to a strategy of tip-toeing around the tulips in a series of start and stop maneuvers to rein-in the credit and building mania....

To the fireflies
That last paragraph raised an interesting aspect (contrasting public expectations and management by the authorities).  Exactly how well will China's population handle the transition which is to arrive once credit markets turn?  On the basis of one unlikely tourist venture, possibly not well.  The below picture (and final image of the post) is from angry holidaymakers who invaded the office of a tour company after a display of firefly insects did not materialise at an organised event:

Visitors shout at organizers during an event to release fireflies in Hangzhou, Zhejiang province, April 30, 2014. According to local media, about 10,000 people protested for a refund of their tickets, claiming they could not find fireflies to release at night. Picture taken April 30, 2014. REUTERS

 

The biggest loser?

The start of 2014 has seen a flood of commentary regarding the Chinese non-bank (trust) financial sector - with the last minute bailout of the oddly named "Credit Equals Gold" trust fund (sold through ICBC branches) in late January and a number of predicted defaults of trust funds linked to the coal sector (or actual default in the case of Jilin Trust) in February. As Bloomberg notes, yields on debt securities are also rising making finance more expensive for businesses in China, but the borrowing binge is continuing, with the FT reporting the highest rates of lending in four years (and a flood of new entrants into the trust and wealth management sector).

As longtime financing expert Charlene Chu has noted, there is increasing currency risk in the system as more borrowers resort to offshore lending.  In the same article in the Telegraph, George Magnus of UBS notes the similarity with Japan before its crash in the 1980s.  Unhelpfully as Ambrose Evans-Pritchard notes in his Telegraph comment piece, this is occurring amidst a policy of monetary tightening and contraction as the administration in China tries to rein in the heady boom of the last decade.

Notwithstanding the current focus on losses within China it is interesting to note some consideration being given to just how much will be lost by foreign lenders.  As Sean Darby, an equity strategist at Jeffries has noted there is significant exposure not only in Hong Kong (China's primary offshore investment centre), but in the banks of Australia, Europe and elsewhere.  It doesn't help that in Australia's case, the large domestic banks which are stuffed high with local real estate loans, desperate for growth opportunities are now aggressively moving into the Chinese market (see also here).

The below chart from Bloomberg (full size image here) shows the rapid growth of foreign lenders' exposure to China and in particular it is interesting to note the high exposures of British, French and Australian banks.  This may be something they come to regret.





(c) Bloomberg

 



 

A year to savour?

2013 saw a lot of changes to the mood in China, with the transition of Xi Jinping and introduction of a reform agenda, launched last month at the Third Party Plenum.  There was plenty of political intrigue with the trial of Bo Xilai, endless other officials and detention of Zhou Yongkang.  The first hints of the banking crisis emerged, with spikes in the interbank market in June and early December.  Property and asset markets remained turbulent and tensions in Western China remained.  And regional tensions escalated with the declaration of the Air Defence Identification Zone over the disputed areas of the South China Sea.
 
It seems fairly likely that recent interbank stress has involved non-disclosed defaults by Mainland institutions - China Everbright Bank's default during the first Shibor Spike was only revealed this month when a note in its IPO prospectus revealed two of its branches had defaulted in June, although quickly paid up (while at the time reports of branch closures and ATM shutdowns were dismissed as due to technical errors).  As in June the PBOC did belatedly intervene to calm the markets with liquidity injections (a Christmas offering if you like), but there is little likelihood this pattern of crisis and belated resolution won't be repeated.
 
As noted on the Investing in Chinese Stocks Blog and elsewhere, the shadow banking system is rampant and a massive risk to the banking system as all manner of schemes with high and unsustainable returns have spread amidst sluggish regulated below inflation rates available in the mainstream banking system.  Worse still, as has been noted before, although the entities providing such returns (trusts and other structures sold as "wealth management products") are outside the formal banking system, their products are sold to bank customers and banks either own or have exposure to the entities.  The bankruptcy of mining giant Liangsheng (a coal acquisition group overburdened by debt) is an example likely to be seen more frequently and already of a scale which could threaten China's banking system.  Most significantly losses track back immediately to the investors and a big state owned bank -  as the FT states:

Liansheng had little trouble finding willing lenders among China’s burgeoning shadow banks, which regulators have allowed to help plug the financing gap.

From late 2011 to early 2012, Jilin Trust, one of China’s vast array of non-bank financial institutions, sold to investors an investment product worth Rmb1bn backed entirely by loans to Liansheng.

Jilin Trust warned investors at the start of this month that the first tranche of the Liansheng loans was nearing maturity and that the mining company had yet to cover what is owed, according to China Business News, a local financial newspaper.

...Liansheng’s troubles are a reminder of the thin dividing line between China’s banks and its shadow lending industry. The Liansheng loan product sold by Jilin Trust was distributed in part via China Construction Bank, the country’s second-biggest lender by assets.

Banks tell customers they do not guarantee trust products, which offer returns far higher than traditional bank deposits, but buyers often ignore the warnings in the belief they carry the banks’ implicit backing. The Liansheng investment product targeted an annual return of 9.8 per cent.

And notwithstanding the proposed interest rate liberalisation, repression in the banking system creates opportunities for the shadow banking system to flourish while as the former chief economist and spokesman of the National Bureau of Statistics in China describes it, the banking system does not work in any efficient manner at all, but rather could be run by a canine:
 

“Banking in China has become like a highway toll system,” Yao Jingyuan said at a Saturday summit on China’s economy held at Nanjing University. “Banks charge every time money goes through them.

"With this kind of operational model, banks will continue making money even if all the bank presidents go home to sleep and you replaced them by putting a small dog in their seats.”

Yao added that there were no longer any real bankers in China, and that most bankers had become “freeloaders” who latched onto the wide profit margin they could enjoy by taking advantage of interest differences between deposits and loans.(here).

With this sort of oversight it will be a wonder if any Chinese banks don't get into trouble next year. 

In the meantime, this article will be rounded out with a couple of photographs which seem to capture the mood at the moment.

"President Li buys his own steamed buns"

 

The above is the actual headline from the report of an unusual purchase by a Chinese President.  Given the clear level of deference and hierarchy still in place in China, what hope is there of genuine financial reform? For example as with the PBOC, so the shipbuilding industry has also been bailed out.

The likely outcome for the Chinese financial sector in 2014?

Xie Shuizhun, a 46-year-old man from central China's Hubei province, earns his living by charging random strangers in Guangzhou's Baiyun district to beat him up, at a rate of 5 yuan (US$0.82) per punch. He insists the punches do not hurt him because he practices the ancient Chinese art of Qigong, which allows him to inflate his belly like a rubber ball.

Back in 2014!

 

 

The rising of three suns

Recently China watchers have added to their experience of weird weather phenomena by witnessing the rising of three suns in Chifeng city - due to the presence of ice crystals high in the atmosphere which reflect the sunlight downwards.  Perhaps symbolic the phenomena occurred prior to the convening of the third plenum Party conference (that is the significant third meeting of Xi Jinping's premiership), when the most important policies and overall direction of the administration is laid out.

Reports from the main session of the plenum proceedings were mixed, commitments to market opening and deepening were contrasted with an absence of concrete measures to tackle some of the more significant issues in China, including the rampant state owned entities which distort the Chinese economy and waste resources (summary also here).  Meanwhile foreign journalists faced difficulty getting into China to report and/or (allegedly) the prospect of self-censorship of certain significant news investigations.

On the modernisation drive Bloomberg did report on developments from the new free trade zone in Shanghai, including the opening of a massive gold vault which will store up to 2,000 metric tonnes of gold.  Gold bugs are speculating on possible future outcomes from the high volumes of Chinese gold buying, constituting a seminal moment when gold had moved from "west to east".  Adding to this, speculation of the adoption of international rather than Chinese law in the free trade zones (similar to Hong Kong) suggest that much is happening.

The reality may be different however.  China's (and the world's) largest bank ICBC, has been added to the list of globally systemically important banks by the global bank regulator, the Financial Stability Board (which is hosted by the Bank of International Settlements), meaning tougher capital requirements.  And there has been declining interest in lower tier banks coming to market - mid-sized Huishang Bank, which acts as an intermediary in the shadow sector (including transactions involving entrusted loans and other interbank off-balance sheet lending) saw lacklustre demand following its recent Hong Kong IPO, with analysts divided as to whether the IPO of one of the original four Chinese bad debt vehicles, Cinda (an asset management company) expected in December will be well received.  As even profligate local governments are staring to see more scrutiny (not only in calls for action from the central government but also from their constituents), the scale of Chinese indebtedness may be fully revealed.

More abstract perhaps but there are some analysts who doubt the short term impacts of the proposed reforms to China's financial system.  Pu Yonghao, UBS's head of Asia research, says China may experience a period of economic hardship over the next two to three years.

And in other news it was reported that disgraced solar panel company Suntech has filed for provisional liquidation in the Cayman Islands (following a buyout of some of its business and attempts to save it by the local government).  There could be more to come.