Lost century?

Back to work
Following a relatively smooth 18th party congress, China Inc has got back to work, albeit with a slightly different vision for more balanced growth.  There was not so much to take away from the various press showpieces, especially since (as is usual), many of the real decisions had been made in the final days leading up to the summit.  A post mortem piece in the Chicago Tribune highlighted the role of retired senior figures still play in the party - there must have been plenty of non-Chinese wondering what Jiang Zemin was doing centre stage at the conference.  The Wen family saga  rolled on, with a second instalment from the New York Times examining the very profitable stake held in insurance blue chip Ping An insurance by Wen's family and the lobbying to Wen on behalf of Ping An in 1999.  Wen's response included being asked to be forgotten.

In the swansong atmosphere it seemed likely that press would look around for an identifiable theme and many outlets settled on comparisons with Japan at its zenith.  One comparison, in a fairly high level of detail for the BBC was quite simply titled "Will China fall flat on its face"!  One of the most concerning points of comparison, which has been noted elsewhere, was the different developmental stage between China and Japan - thanks to its one child policy and it starting form a much lower income base, China has rapidly accelerated the aging of its population to now approaching Japanese levels (though getting a dividend along the way with a relative boost of young workers which is now decelerating) and consequently may grow old before it grows rich. 

More worrying in the immediate term was the surprisingly candid, though balanced piece by Charles Dumas of Lombard Street Research who nicely brought together all of the strands of the Chinese economy which are of concern - debt, stimulus, defaults.  What is particularly worrying is the ease with which, in 2 places, Charles can lead to a conclusion of the occurrence of banking crises - as a matter of course, as inevitable as a policy setting! - without policy change (debt reduction) and with trend growth shifting down to 5 per cent, "a plague of banking crises" could be a result, as could occur if financial liberalisation proceeds.  This is not the story spun by the large financial institutions promoting use of the Chinese currency (the Yuan/Renminbi) in trade settlement and with greater convertibility.

But these two things combined paint a worrying picture.  If China has all of the preconditions of a Japanese style financial collapse - sufficient to bring about the slow burning decline of a "lost decade" or "lost generation" (a term in vogue even in the West as it pushes through austerity, or in the case of the European Union, can-kicking), then could the less favourable demographics, level of social cohesion or uncertain environment make the impact for China worse than Japan?  As it happens there are deep social divisions in China with assertive foreign policy in areas like the South China Sea stirring tensions amongst the population and with reports of inequality and division within Chinese society attracting increasing concern and attention.  The task of the Chinese Communist Party to reinvent itself for slower growth and newer ideologies also complicates things.  Added sleaze and corruption scandals make for grim prospects.

Underlying the resurgence of nationalism is a sense of continuity with the period from the mid-19th century until the mid-20th century, when the sovereignty of the Chinese empire and state was subjugated to foreign powers and influence, starting with the First Opium War until the expulsion of foreigners after the Second World War (the Century of Humiliation).  As commentators have noted, the current administration perpetuates the focus on restoration of international profile and prestige while skipping over the Party's failures. Inability for self-criticism may come to harm the Party and the nation in years to come, and should the effects of China's boom be felt across one or more generations, Chinese may have to face up to another century of lost potential in many years to come.

Cracks appear in the China bull market (c) Caixin

Generation game

Solar flare up
Since the last post there have been moves to further consolidation and government control of the solar industry as two of the largest players, LDK and Suntech are facing increased state involvement and even takeover.  Amidst global oversupply, plummeting prices and possible trade law sanctions, a couple of themes are present (i) use of bankruptcy is not prevalent yet (with rollovers of debt preferred) and (ii) increasing state involvement.  An excellent article by Tim Worstall in Forbes had a headline which summed up the situation - "China still hasn't got the hang of this capitalism thing", namely the importance of unprofitable enterprises going bankrupt.  It would seem fairly obvious that there are plenty of impediments to swift and orderly wind-down of institutions - loss of face, bureaucratic interference, vested local government interests and the like.

But it wasn't supposed to be like this - the article refers to an official who pronounced that the government intended the industry to consolidate - i.e. a large number of enterprises close or merge - intentions which were complicated by unwillingness of banks and local governments to toe the line.    And what a contrast from the fanfare in a previous Forbes article announcing the launch of the new US style bankruptcy regime China in 2007 - the predictions of a "high level of sophistication" and "determination to build a sound legal system" seem over-enthusiastic statements now.  Possibly due to the need to promote stability ahead of the leadership change next month, officials seem to be falling back to tried and tested methods of state interventionism, which will only continue to propagate distortions in the current financial system.

It's a family affair
At the time of writing there has been an overwhelming response to the New York Times' investigation into the wealth and connections of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's family.  It is not just that the Chinese administration has blocked access to the Times' website (as it did with Bloomberg and the Brookings Institution when they released similar findings regarding incoming Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang), responded with what the Financial Times referred to as a "hatchet job" piece in the People's Daily, or that unusually the administration has instructed lawyers to deny and  look at pursuing legal redress (which members of the legal community thought were poorly thought out) With the Guardian comparing it to the Pentagon Papers as the most "direct challenge to a sitting government", it is clear that the investigation has ruffled feathers at a sensitive time.

It is not clear yet if there will be a lasting impact from these revelations about China's leaders - the Economist which has a special report covering the upcoming Party Congress, concludes that all the disclosures strengthen the case for reform.  Like many similar autocracies the connected elite of China have had an entrenched position for a long time in China and it seems unlikely that this will change after the handover beyond certain personnel changes (which was the conclusion of Katherine Hille in the FT).  But could tensions between ruling factions and their connected others spillover after the transition?

Factional tension was suggested by Hille (noting rumours on Chinese social media that information in the New York Times had been provided by factional opponents of Wen) and more broadly the Wen revelations have opened a greater discussion on corruption in China, which as the FT Alphaville blog noted that perceptions of corruption were reaching levels where they could be destabilising.  Cue then a closed door lecture from a Chinese (or Hong Kong-based) academic arguing that China is in fact nearly bankrupt and a warning from permanent China bear Gordon Chang warning that there is now a "stampede" of money and even officials are now fleeing China and all does not seem well.

A light-hearted piece in the Daily Mail might suggest otherwise (with news of a marriage of the niece of president-in-waiting Xi Jinping to a young unknown British businessman, Daniel Foa) but there is a very deep family tension involved in this year's leadership trauma.  Forming part of a highly recommendable podcast of experts (comprising Chovanec, Garnaut and Anderlini) was a real insight into the the deep inter-generational enmity between Jinping and Xilai (and their factions in the Party), which had arisen between their fathers, Xi Zhongxun and Bo Yibo, during the cultural revolution.  Garnaut in particular has been in explosive form revealing casualties of the factional struggles for position in both the military and political leadership. Add to this interventions of factions led by Hu Jintao/Wen Jiabao and Jiang Zemin and things look set for an explosive mix.

An Englishman called Daniel Foa holds a book (c) ImageChina

As has been noted China's new leaders are likely to signal a clear directional change in policy very soon after the handover (as has been customary).  Whether they retain a princeling dominance and an absolute autocracy or opt for a more compromising approach (such as a management focussed Singaporean model) will remain to be seen.