Generation game

Solar flare up
Since the last post there have been moves to further consolidation and government control of the solar industry as two of the largest players, LDK and Suntech are facing increased state involvement and even takeover.  Amidst global oversupply, plummeting prices and possible trade law sanctions, a couple of themes are present (i) use of bankruptcy is not prevalent yet (with rollovers of debt preferred) and (ii) increasing state involvement.  An excellent article by Tim Worstall in Forbes had a headline which summed up the situation - "China still hasn't got the hang of this capitalism thing", namely the importance of unprofitable enterprises going bankrupt.  It would seem fairly obvious that there are plenty of impediments to swift and orderly wind-down of institutions - loss of face, bureaucratic interference, vested local government interests and the like.

But it wasn't supposed to be like this - the article refers to an official who pronounced that the government intended the industry to consolidate - i.e. a large number of enterprises close or merge - intentions which were complicated by unwillingness of banks and local governments to toe the line.    And what a contrast from the fanfare in a previous Forbes article announcing the launch of the new US style bankruptcy regime China in 2007 - the predictions of a "high level of sophistication" and "determination to build a sound legal system" seem over-enthusiastic statements now.  Possibly due to the need to promote stability ahead of the leadership change next month, officials seem to be falling back to tried and tested methods of state interventionism, which will only continue to propagate distortions in the current financial system.

It's a family affair
At the time of writing there has been an overwhelming response to the New York Times' investigation into the wealth and connections of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's family.  It is not just that the Chinese administration has blocked access to the Times' website (as it did with Bloomberg and the Brookings Institution when they released similar findings regarding incoming Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang), responded with what the Financial Times referred to as a "hatchet job" piece in the People's Daily, or that unusually the administration has instructed lawyers to deny and  look at pursuing legal redress (which members of the legal community thought were poorly thought out) With the Guardian comparing it to the Pentagon Papers as the most "direct challenge to a sitting government", it is clear that the investigation has ruffled feathers at a sensitive time.

It is not clear yet if there will be a lasting impact from these revelations about China's leaders - the Economist which has a special report covering the upcoming Party Congress, concludes that all the disclosures strengthen the case for reform.  Like many similar autocracies the connected elite of China have had an entrenched position for a long time in China and it seems unlikely that this will change after the handover beyond certain personnel changes (which was the conclusion of Katherine Hille in the FT).  But could tensions between ruling factions and their connected others spillover after the transition?

Factional tension was suggested by Hille (noting rumours on Chinese social media that information in the New York Times had been provided by factional opponents of Wen) and more broadly the Wen revelations have opened a greater discussion on corruption in China, which as the FT Alphaville blog noted that perceptions of corruption were reaching levels where they could be destabilising.  Cue then a closed door lecture from a Chinese (or Hong Kong-based) academic arguing that China is in fact nearly bankrupt and a warning from permanent China bear Gordon Chang warning that there is now a "stampede" of money and even officials are now fleeing China and all does not seem well.

A light-hearted piece in the Daily Mail might suggest otherwise (with news of a marriage of the niece of president-in-waiting Xi Jinping to a young unknown British businessman, Daniel Foa) but there is a very deep family tension involved in this year's leadership trauma.  Forming part of a highly recommendable podcast of experts (comprising Chovanec, Garnaut and Anderlini) was a real insight into the the deep inter-generational enmity between Jinping and Xilai (and their factions in the Party), which had arisen between their fathers, Xi Zhongxun and Bo Yibo, during the cultural revolution.  Garnaut in particular has been in explosive form revealing casualties of the factional struggles for position in both the military and political leadership. Add to this interventions of factions led by Hu Jintao/Wen Jiabao and Jiang Zemin and things look set for an explosive mix.

An Englishman called Daniel Foa holds a book (c) ImageChina

As has been noted China's new leaders are likely to signal a clear directional change in policy very soon after the handover (as has been customary).  Whether they retain a princeling dominance and an absolute autocracy or opt for a more compromising approach (such as a management focussed Singaporean model) will remain to be seen.

Two steps forward?

Gathering headwinds...
After a break from blog-posting it is interesting to see a consensus forming as doubts further crystallise around the China and BRICS growth story.  At least on one report, the IMF has joined the increasing ranks of observers who are bearish on growth prospects, while in Beijing another chapter in the grizzly Bo Xilai saga progressed when, on the eve of a national holiday, it was announced that a consensus on the persistent political questions had been reached - Bo Xilai would be expelled from the party (to face a criminal trial) and the 18th National Party Congress would take place on 8 October (apparently a date which will bring good fortune).

Good luck will be needed, because China is facing a number of headwinds, including tensions with Japan over disputed islands and the slowing economy which has even been noticed in the wealthy tech hub of Dongguan.  Aggressive positioning such as talk of rapid sales of Japanese bonds by the Chinese (at a time when it is trying to diversify its holdings of US treasuries), a no-show by Chinese banks at an IMF Conference in Japan (when Chinese banks may need assistance from the IMF sometime in the future) and announcements of ever-increasing local stimulus (which UBS called "unicorn", JP Morgan called "castles in the air" and the Beyond Brics team have taken to comparing by regional cuisine), seem counter-productive while uncertainty surrounded China's leader-in-waiting, who disappeared for 12 days recently.

The human side to the evolving atmosphere has come to the fore recently - not only with the riots at Foxconn facilities (and if you are hoping to read this on an iphone 5 - deepest sympathies), but also with deflationary prospects further reducing likelihood of a rebalancing and growth in consumer demand.  Gavekal Dragonomics has noted that given the current destocking cycle and fading CPI numbers, a little bit of inflation may be a good thing.  At the sharper end, industries like solar are desperately trying to slash costs and restructure debts.

Chinese de-stocking in action

A gold postscript
There have been some interesting commentaries about global currencies and the monetary system in the past couple of weeks, including from the Economist and from George Magnus of UBS who still sees issues from global savings imbalances.  Following on from the last post there has been some further discussion of the possibility that China is in fact stockpiling gold (here also and even that China and Russia are stockpiling in concert in response to US quantitative easing).  Ironically for both China and Russia, any suggestion of monetary system strength has been challenged by heavy use of reverse repos by the countries' central banks (by which the central banks inject cash into the domestic banks in exchange for securities  - other link here).

It was noted in the commentary of the Russian moves that the repos coincided with announcements from the Central Bank of Russia that it would not intervene to support the Ruble (Russia's currency).  While it was noted that this was a gesture likely to be received well by markets as pro-reform (like Renminbi liberalisation in China), especially given the CBR's previous failures to do so, the alternative explanation, that the central banks simply do not have sufficient resources to defend their currencies from outflows.  Parallel to this it was announced that official estimates predicted a sooner than expected ending for Russia's long established current account surplus, due to falling exports and high government expenditure.

Beyond any policy preferences the central banks may have in pursuing reverse repos (and the short term stimulus they provide), there remain risks for the central banks, namely i) that they will become less effective and ii) the central bank will run out of resources to execute the repo operations.  There is evidence of both these effects in China (links here and here).

Some analysts expect ineffective repos could lead to an RRR cut (reducing the amount banks are required to hold in deposits) which could free up lending and accelerate inflation and stoke lending and the property bubble - something it turns out is additionally caused by social factors including the one child policy according to Foreign Policy magazine.  Growth in the Chinese property market is already picking up, but as shown by Also Sprach Analyst in a current series, the current valuation models may significantly miscalculate the market.

A call for more clarity on China is probably due.  Or at least after the unicorns are gone.

The audacity of hope

Bears rally
A couple of provocative headlines hit the newsfeeds this week as some notably bearish Chinese analysts digested the recent stimulus announcements.  Gordon Chang's article "China is running out of money"  certainly grabbed attention and while much of the discussion about the country's central bank, the People's Bank of China (and its ability to maintain the system of foreign exchange inflows) has been covered before, details of how short some local authorities are of money right now is rather new (and emerging).

In contrast, investors' optimism about the extent of the current stimulus is well illustrated by a slide from a recent Rio Tinto investor presentation (below).  Frequent readers will recognise one of the project leaders - the National Development Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) which Victor Shih and others have identified as being at times a very effective rubber stamp executing little scrutiny of projects it approves (including earlier in the year a project to influence the weather).

Michael Pascoe of the Sydney Morning Herald is one China bull who saw only a soft landing from the stimulus and in pro-reform comments of a Bank of China official.  Similarly doveish comments from Jiang Chaoliang, chairman of pillar bank AgBank (Agricultural Bank of China) suggested a benign situation of measured reform.  However it is questionable how much the necessary reforms and consumption increases will proceed during a stimulus given fairly little progress made on such things during the last round of stimulus in 2008-9.

Meanwhile at respected magazine Caixin, Andy Xie sought to put recent conditions into perspective, with some dire forecasts for the property and finance sectors:

China's land market will experience a dramatic adjustment ahead. In most cities, land prices may fall by 80 percent. The financial consequences will be severe. Most bank loans are backed up directly or indirectly by land. If land prices fall so much, the banking system would suffer a crippling level of bad loans. Local governments increased their spending appetite during the heyday of land sales. They will have a difficult time adjusting to the new reality. Their struggle to source new revenues will be the main reason for social instability ahead.

And adding difficulty the FT's Beyond Brics blog noted, was that the fact that many statistics releases which drive the China news cycle seem to increasingly split analyst opinion (pointing to more or less future growth in equal measure).  Similar to the debates as to whether key Chinese statistics are falsified - a recent report examined opposing interpretations of rising non-performing loans data by Reuters and Bloomberg. Reuters' conclusion, that it was a positive sign (looking at the overall ratios provided by the China Banking Regulatory Commission), was favoured.

Chinese property, it's a long way down...

Reluctant consolidations
While questions remain over the long term outcomes from the new stimulus, other commentators have noted falling profits across a number of sectors and in some cases a run of bankruptcies is looking likely.  Three industries which have been observed to be at risk of widespread bankruptcies are the solar panel makers, shipbuilders and automakers.

For manufacturers of photo-voltaic cells there have been plenty of headlines for Chinese companies, themselves struggling against a backdrop of oversupply and falling prices. Suntech, the largest solar panel maker in the world, announced it had been defrauded by an Italian co-investor (who offered fake German bonds as security for a payment guarantee) and just recently obtained a worldwide freezing order against its Italian partner's assets.  Even without this, the company is struggling under a weight of debt.  LDK Solar, based in Xinyu was bailed out by the local authority last month, although some commentators doubted whether even this would be sufficient to restore the companies' prospects.

Chinese shipbuilders meanwhile are continuing to tread water through the worst conditions in a decade.  Major builders including Rongsheng and Cosco have recently been hit by profit concerns amongst falling orders and shrinking backlogs, while there have been several bankruptcies including Dalian Oriental Precision & Engineering and a major shipbuilder in Zheijiang province.

And local car manufacturers (who have been flooding dealers with unsold inventories) face the prospect of being forced into bankruptcy by local authorities due to widespread anticipation of failures.  As this report from Ken Rapoza in Forbes explained:

The Ministry said in a note published on Tuesday that it is considering the introduction of a withdrawal mechanism to force near-bankrupt automakers out of the bloated automotive industry.  China has around 1,300 automobile makers, including 171 car, truck and bus makers and more than 900 specialty vehicle manufacturers, according to the government.
Nearly a quarter of these manufacturers are on the verge of bankruptcy, barely producing anything despite obtaining production approvals from supervising authorities, the statement said.

Restructuring with Chinese characteristics
The announcement of forced restructuring of the automotive sector is interesting because it shows the role of the state in dictating the policy direction for much of the industry.  State involvement has been a feature of industry restructuring throughout China's history, and most notably during the aftermath of the Asian crisis, when  many International Trading and Investment Corporations (ITICs) - forerunners of current Local Government Financing Vehicles and investment trusts, collapsed and when the banking system was restructured.

At the time, there was no advanced nor comprehensive bankruptcy law governing the restructuring of state-owned entities and private entities.  As William Gamble, an investor with experience in that period has noted, the bankruptcy legislation applicable in 1998, when GITIC collapsed, did not recognise security interests or allow for restructuring (nor could foreigners' investments into ITICS even be registered with Chinese regulators).

A new bankruptcy regime, which is more sophisticated and borrows elements from US legislation and other jurisdictions was implemented in 2007, but its effectiveness remains to be seen as courts and other officials establish a practice of using and enforcing the new regime.  Also in a new trend, Simon Rabinovitch in an FT article this week, noted that more parties seem to be using local courts to resolve contractual and debt claims across a number of Chinese regions.  

It seems there is much more than just a simple increase in litigation volumes - generally speaking local and regional state authorities, with their close ties to businesses seem to play a very dominant role in either leading arrangements to stave off bankruptcy (causing a lighter caseload and a slimmer practice of dealing with bankruptcies) or as in the case of the automotive industry - taking a dominant role in which foreign investors may be marginalised and/or unfamiliar.  Reports of the pending bankruptcy of the Zhongdan Guarantee company (which was exposed by the collapse of the Tianyu Construction Company and 600 companies which were connected to it by a network of guarantees) indicate that the Beijing city government is directing the restructuring response which is expected to get underway later this month.  And Zhongdan apparently was also involved in selling WMPs (below).  Should there be more businesses like Zhongdan to be bankrupted, this could lead to a deterioration of market sentiment and intensification of any crisis, should it arise in China.

"No touch" regulation
Watchers of Chinese bank finances noticed a shrinking of deposits and increase in interbank liabilities in bank capital reports which many commentators are blaming on the rise of WMPs - wealth management products, unregulated speculative investments which Chinese banks have been using to source new loan capital and which are popular with bank customers as they offer interest rates far above regulated deposits.

Nothing wrong with little or no regulation in the short term (in China) you might think, however it has emerged that many of the products do not have recourse to specific assets and are increasingly appearing to have the characteristics of a pyramid or ponzi scheme (with there not being enough assets to cover redemption requests or meet all obligations), the collapse of which could trigger financial contagion.  An excellent Reuters piece uncovered one product which it likened to an American subprime mortgage (of dubious quality), being marketed to the public under the name "Golden Elephant" and whose source of income derived from property assets which were yet to be built.

While Chinese regulated banks themselves have questions to answer regarding their NPLs (which may challenge their solvency) the growth of WMPs and so-called "shadow banks" could threaten a significant crisis in the Chinese financial system.  Recent discussions on various blogs this week reminded that there are a number of precedents of this sort of scheme which could equally apply to China.  For both Russia and Albania in the 1990s (and Poland in the last few years), pyramid and ponzi schemes were able to flourish escaping weak and slow moving regulators in a changing environment and, upon collapse, causing great damage to the economy.  A great paper on the Albanian pyramid scheme phenomenon is here, while in Russia, the famous MMM and GKO scandals (the latter of which contributed to the collapse of the Russian government and precipitated the 1998 Asian crisis) have been well written about (Sergei Mavrodi restarted a new MMM-style scheme online last year).

How it all plays out in China will remain to be seen.