Gorillas in the mist

Goldman Sachs Asset Management chairman Jim O'Neill popped up in the news this week, releasing a note to clients with some revised thinking on prospects for China's economy.  With still a favourable overall view, O'Neill considered several likely outcomes for Chinese growth, including a "pessimistic" outlook of 7% GDP growth.  An interesting point in his analysis - that in any worst case growth scenario, the Chinese government is "surely to step in", attracted some comment as many noted that given certain conflicting undercurrents and factional conflicts within the administration and the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese authorities may not be willing or able to intervene.

Similar to the reaction when various large Chinese cities announced vast new spending programs, some observers were sceptical as to whether bold political action will be as likely be delivered as in 2008.  O'Neill's fund meanwhile has been promoting a new set of fast-growing MIST countries (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey) which have been the star performers in the fund's popular Next 11 fund. And the failure to even consider a less than 7% GDP growth outcome (when some commentators consider that growth may be negative) suggests O'Neill might just be missing a gorilla in the room - Asian (and Chinese) slowdown which others believe may not be priced in by the market.

A very strategic resource
The last couple of weeks saw a renewed debate considering the return of a gold standard as a way to restore stability to the global economy and encourage growth (and end America's money printing), even while the balance of opinion believes such a standard is a false hope or otherwise likely to result in the stagnation currently seen in the Eurozone (which as Peter Coy explained arguably is committed to a new gold standard).

There is an interesting angle for China in this debate, as it has been active in the gold markets.  As you may recall China has been trying a basket of different measures to manage its economy including Keynesian stimulus in 2008, enormous foreign exchange reserves, capital controls and now liberalising exchange rates (which may be countering each other in effectiveness).  In fact reports have emerged which provide detail of China's activities in gold as well.

In addition to outright purchases of the metal, interest was also expressed from Chinese companies in acquiring gold producers.  In its report of China's largest gold producer, China National, considering the acquisition of a majority stake in the African subsidiary of the world's largest gold miner, Barrick, the Beyond Brics blog reported that the company's president, Sun Zhaoxue believes that China should view gold as a "strategic resource as important as petroleum energy".  That might partly explain why there is a gold mining division in the Chinese internal security forces (the People's Armed Police).

As well as its value as a metal, reserves of gold have been argued by some as a better store of value for a national central bank than government bonds, especially in a low inflation environment where the government issuer of the bonds is engaging in monetary easing (which depresses the yield as the price increases from the asset purchases).  In China's case it is looking for an alternative store of value to offset its huge holding of US Treasuries (US government bonds) which earn low rates of interest because the US is engaging in Quantitative Easing (printing money by buying US Treasuries) and which it cannot liqidate easily.  The liberalisation of the Renminbi (i.e. the process of opening the Chinese currency to full convertibility) is seen as one step that can counter-balance China's US dollar holdings (as the greater volumes of Renminbi will be used and deposited internationally).  Sun Zhaoxue alludes to this in his article.

However it is questionable whether holding gold ipso facto will ensure greater security for China.  How so? Well looking into some of the debate around the merits of a gold standard suggested that the credibility of the system might be more important than the physical holding itself.

I hold therefore I am
Outspoken financial journalist Max Keiser, has looked at a number of commodity stories, including possible manipulation of the silver market by JP Morgan and its high frequency trading (HFT) business (background here).  In a recent broadcast Keiser examined some of the justifications given by gold bugs (especially libertarians in the US), who he found often confuse their libertarian values (such as objectivism advocated by Rand) with the behavioural principles of the "Austrian school" (advocates of a gold standard).

A key question in the discussion was the degree to which financial institutions could issue credit secured against their gold reserves - it is only physical gold which is the "ultimate extinguisher of credit", but the use of fiat (paper) money removes the gold from credit making it easier to expand credit (which if prolonged can cause inflation and is exaggerated by quantitative easing).

In his article Peter Coy blames the First World War for causing the inflationary expansion of credit which destabilised the gold standard, however according to the Cato Institute (which is apparently libertarian) in a paper on this topic, von Mises, a key figure in this analysis, believed that instead of the war, it was the attempts by bankers to get around the gold standard and increase credit in the economy, when, from the 1890s the world's central bankers relaxed the standards of inter-central bank credits:

 It was'' not the old classical gold standard, with effective gold circulation,'' that failed after 1929; what failed was'' the gold 'economizing' system and the credit policy of the central banks of issue'' 

What von Mises proposed (to address this inherent conflict) was that the gold standard should be operated completely independently of monetary matters and essentially gold should be valued at production cost.  And this is interesting because it seems to be a call for independence, similar to that underlying the Bitcoin digital currency, which operates free of any government and is instead backed by the power of the computing network of Bitcoin users (with no centralised issuing authority).

All of this would suggest that credibility is important.  As well as the amount of gold which the People's Bank of China (the central bank) or other bank may hold, financial market participants will also assess how credible those banks are in administering and valuing such reserves.  This may not be as simple an assessment as it seems.

In gold (and tungsten) we trust...

Frauds of the week
Mentions must go out to:  the Chinese Art market (worth $13 billion according to Forbes magazine) and  China Sky One Medical and its chief executive (which the SEC charged with securities fraud this week for overstating financial results).

Goodbye to BRICS?

The economies of the much talked-about BRICS countries are crumbling.  This was the headline in a post this week in the FT blog, Beyond Brics (which has these emerging economies as its focus).  Perhaps for the first time in a long while, disappointing economic news came out this week for each economy in the club first identified by Goldman Sachs' Jim O'Neill in 2001 (and formally launched in 2009).  For China, significant attention was paid to Thursday's unexpected interest rate cut by the central bank, the first since 2008.  Despite initial positive reactions, concerns were later raised that a) Chinese authorities would not have the scope to conduct loosening on the scale necessary or similar to the stimulus in 2008 (or if it did it could be detrimental) and b) that the rate cut may in fact have been driven by more serious concerns of slowdown which may be revealed by monthly production data, to be released this weekend.

Pumping in cash
Prior to the interest rate cut, the methods of stimulus were in focus with many concerned that some of the excesses of the 2008 stimulus be avoided.  Attention was paid to the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), a bureaucratic body which approves many large-scale development projects and had gone into overdrive in 2008/9.  Just how rapidly the NDRC rubber-stamped big ticket projects then was studied by Victor Shih (discussed in a forum last year, link here).  Meanwhile Victor noted on his twitter feed that the NDRC had also recently approved a "bad-ass project to artificially influence weather in NE China" (announcement here).

The NDRC has also approved several large steel projects, at a time when the sector is unprofitable.  As discussed with steel companies, the concern is not only that stimulus financing could be misallocated to inefficient projects which lose money (and result in increasing non-performing bank loans), but also that money provided (for bricks and mortar purposes) may be diverted into further lending and speculation.  Recent shorting of the stock of construction machinery maker Zoomlion (listed on the Shenzen and Hong Kong exchanges) has exposed the ingenuity of some operators with suggestions that even some of its concrete mixers may have been acquired to be used as collateral for further lending.

One development project which needs funding

Business as usual?
Meanwhile Chinese officials do seem to be seeking to assert more control over information in the financial sector.  Recent Wall Street Journal articles gave some interesting details about measures which have been viewed sceptically by foreign investors and regulators, including requirements for greater localisation of foreign accounting firms and a recent decision at one of the key repositories of data on Chinese companies, the State Administration of Industry and Commerce, to significantly restrict access to its records (which may have been related to the fact that these records were used by many of the foreign analysts who short-sold stocks of Chinese companies in the last 2 years).  In contrast, problems of oversight remain in the banking sector, where implementation of the Basel III banking reforms have been further delayed to commence in 2013 and the executive vice president of the Agricultural Bank of China (one of the large, listed pillar banks of the Chinese economy) was detained on corruption charges at the end of May.

Perspectives on the Chinese currency
As mentioned previously, a bit more coverage of the Chinese currency is overdue- a topic which can be a little confusing simply by the fact that it has several denominations (offshore/onshore) and two interchangeable titles in reports - Renminbi/yuan (with the latter being the unit of denomination) as well as the nickname of the "redback".  Until 2009, there was not much to say about the Renminbi except that it was in a fixed and then managed float, and was undervalued against the US dollar.  With US pressure and liberalisation measures, the value of the Renminbi has started to change recently.

Some background to note - one of the reasons China was reluctant to allow a flexible Renminbi rate was fear of "Plaza" - fear that the Renminbi could appreciate rapidly in the same manner as the Japanese Yen did after the coordinated action of central banks to devalue the US dollar in 1985 (pursuant to the Plaza Accord).  Many view the appreciation as a key causative factor in the asset bubble which triggered the collapse of the Japanese economy and the subsequent slow growth in the 1990's referred to as the "lost decade".  In China's case, the fear is that a rapid appreciation of the Renminbi (which could start upon a free float) could eat into China's export economy and threaten jobs and social harmony quite significantly.  From the US perspective, similar to 1985 position against the Yen, the undervalued Renminbi has been a key cause in the large US trade deficit with China and allowing it to float would cause an appreciation (and dollar depreciation) that would give a boost to US exporters and shrink the enormous imbalances with China (in particular the People's Republic's gargantuan holdings of US Treasuries).

While most commentators viewed a simple appreciation as neither feasible nor a solution, the policy background has become more complicated.  In particular:

i) Policy makers have favoured gradual liberalisation or "internationalisation" to diversify China's reserve holdings away from US dollars and to open up the Renminbi to use in international trade settlement and as an international reserve currency.  From 2009, measures were adopted to allow greater international use of the Renminbi, befitting China's status as a pre-eminent trading nation.  The sort of thinking underlying this move is outlined in a recent FT article.

b) A consequence of the measures which have resulted in greater circulation of the Renminbi is increasing complexity of Renminbi valuation.  In particular there are greater opportunities for capital flight and arbitrage between onshore and offshore Renminbi (including those involving stockpiled metal as collateral).  As this insightful Beyond Brics piece notes having looked at recent data from global payments network SWIFT one type of arbitrage that appears to be happening frequently is as follows:

A Chinese company places renminbi on deposit with a mainland bank, earning an interest rate of about 3.5 per cent. The company then obtains a long-dated, renminbi-denominated letter of credit from the bank, ostensibly to pay for a shipment of goods from its own subsidiary in Hong Kong.
In turn, the Hong Kong subsidiary takes the letter of credit to a local bank and uses it as collateral to obtain a US dollar loan at a lower interest rate than those available on the mainland. In many cases, the company would also use a currency derivative to eliminate the foreign exchange risk. The end result: the company has captured the difference between onshore and offshore interest rates, less banker’s fees.

and worringly:

If international trade in the renminbi is largely driven by financial arbitrage, as the extraordinary use of letters of credit implies, then Beijing’s plan to internationalise the renminbi is not exactly going according to plan.

Likewise all is not going according to plan in the offshore "dim sim" bond market where foreign companies issue bonds in Renminbi in Hong Kong (encouraging demand and use for the Renminbi denominated securities) - as noted in May, yields on dim sum bonds have been rising making it cheaper to raise finance in other currencies and markets.  And as mentioned previously, Victor Shih and others have found the impact of capital flight (on flows and valuation) by connected elites could be significant.

c) But perhaps, most significantly, the mechanism by which China recycled US dollar export earnings into reserves (and managed its currency flows domestically) is breaking down, primarily because of an export slowdown plus Europe fears and greater reluctance of exporters to settle their dollar deposits.  A detailed study out by Nomura is described here tracks the slowdown in the accumulation of dollar reserves.  The Nomura team conclude on one aspect - the slowing of the flood of US dollars gives the People's Bank of China more scope to act on monetary policy.  However, if this pattern is sustained, the other effect could be devaluation and/or a need to sell down reserves.  An ING note discussed yesterday concluded that signals to this effect were temporary but this may not be so.  Looking at April data:

The data reinforced fears that the economy was on a slippery slope to a hard landing via an overvalued currency and capital flight..

In the least the note did conclude that the Renminbi was overvalued at the moment (as did the IMF, in a shift from its recent position).  Perhaps a good concluding example of uncertainty with the Renminbi's prospects is seen in this article about a Renminbi deposit account offered by the Bank of China's New York branch.  Set up as part of the internationalisation so that foreigners can hold Renminbi, there is a question though whether they would wish to do so if there is a chance of devaluation?

All those reserves....

Flow on effects
A recent comment from one reader questioned the likely effects of a China slowdown on some of its key trading partners.  As has been discussed previously there is concern amongst exporting economies of the effect of a China slowdown.  The previous week saw negative reaction to BHP executive Ian Ashby's comments of flat predicted Chinese steel demand, while recently the currency and stock markets in Canada, Australia and New Zealand have all declined on expectations of lower Chinese growth.  The FT Alphaville blog had some interesting figures out from researchers showing the growth of imports into China as exports have stagnated and which also singled out Australia and Brazil as having a particularly high share of their exports to China thereby making them vulnerable to a slowdown.

For Canada, which has a US focus but is vulnerable through commodity prices and by the fact that many Chinese companies and companies with China exposure are listed on its sharemarkets, this piece from Reuters had a couple of soundbites from researcher Murray Leith at Odlum Brown in Vancouver:

...The Canadian stock market is very geared to economic growth in China. If China slows, commodity prices moderate and because resource stocks constitute close to half the index that has negative implications....

It will be interesting to see how this develops.

Keeping a big rock in place
To a more long term issue, a fairly common point reached in China discussions in the size of the country's foreign reserves. They're huge, over $3 trillion and are considered by most to provide a sufficient firewall for any potential crisis the country faces.  A lighthearted survey by the Economist of just how many enormously sized things such an amount could buy is here.

Substantial foreign reserves have been de rigeur for emerging market economies for over a decade - in order to protect against fluctuations and rapid devaluations which can follow foreign investors quickly withdrawing direct investments (including speculative capital flows or "hot money") compounded by short sellers wading in to make quick profits betting on further declines in the midst of a crisis.  The lesson many Asian and emerging market countries drew from the Asian Crisis in 1997 was to build up an arsenal of foreign reserves to out-buy any speculators and compensate for any rapid capital flow shortfalls in future.

This need for security against financial contagion seemingly dovetailed nicely with China's longstanding trade policy, which is to achieve large trade surpluses by relying on an undervaluation of its currency, the Yuan or Renminbi (RMB) in particular with its largest trading partner the US (and its currency, the dollar).  As Krugman explained early on in the crisis, this policy wasn't necessarily anticipated or deliberate, but certainly China was locked into accumulating foreign reserves early on - with one problem being that China's reserves were concentrated in US dollars (through China's holdings of US Treasury Notes or debt) which made them vulnerable to falls in the dollar.

At the time there were calls to expand the use of Special Drawing Rights as an alternative to US dollars, although these fell silent and China's planners instead launched the internationalisation of the RMB, which is now used in trade settlements, some instruments and limited capital flows.

China's FX agency...has a few spare yuan down the back of the desk...

However steps to liberalise the capital regime have been gradual and even with some diversification by China into currencies such as the Euro and some overseas M&A, China's gargantuan foreign reserves still have weaknesses.  They do still hold a large position in US Treasuries which would be hard to liquidate (lest their remaining US dollar reserves would fall in value).  The amount of dollars they have to buy makes maintaining the currency peg - buying up all the excess dollars, expensive, while the Central Bank also has to  drain the resulting excess resulting RMB liquidity from the financial system by "sterilising" (requiring banks to buy debt or increase the amount that they must hold in reserve), an imprecise procedure when the Central Bank uses the same tool to conduct domestic interest rate policy.

In general there is no transparency about the precise nature of the reserves and the extent to which the reserves are in fact reinvested into domestic entities (and therefore less valuable) is not known (though Victor Shih has speculated).

The Rising Sun in the Currency Wars
A quite disturbing risk is that China might be unwittingly drawn into the ongoing "currency wars" and in particular a devaluation of the Japanese Yen.  The term "currency wars" came into frequent use in 2010 (Guido Mantega, the Brazilian finance minister used the term often) to describe the series of quantitative easing by developed country central banks (especially the UK and US) to lower their exchange rates and restore competitiveness relative to emerging markets.  Developing countries and especially emerging markets responded by introducing capital controls and restrictions, seeking to fight the tide of liquidity as investors moved money from developed to developing economies to seek returns.

Japan (like Switzerland) was seen as a safe haven, having a sound economy and currency which was seen as still a good store of value.  With increasing flows the value of the Yen has risen to very high levels, eating into the already declining competitiveness of Japan's export industries.  Coupling with a now crippling level of debt and effects from the earthquake, the Bank of Japan has also been involved in easing although it may not be done yet.  A few are now speculating that i) Japan has further easing to do and ii) China may feel the need to respond with its own devaluation to ensure its currency remains cheaper than Japan.  As Mike Dolan points out for Reuters, devaluing the RMB will bring China into conflict with the US, while Andy Xie argues that a big Yen devaluation could cause China's banking system to sink.  It is not clear how Andy imagines the collapse - whether by loss of confidence or speculation however there seems to be enough to at least mount a rebuttal to Michael Pettis who last year in a podcast stated that there was no doubt China's foreign reserves would be sufficient to repel any currency contagion.

And right now?
Of course a country's capital account is in flux and it is worth taking into account money flowing out from a country as well as in.

This year has seen a reversal in that China's foreign reserves shrank for the first time since 1998, while the slowing rate of RMB appreciation has seen China's central bank struggling to find a balance between trying to dampen the impact of investors withdrawing from bets on appreciation and inadvertently causing uncertainty which could encourage substantial capital outflows:

The central bank wants to widen that band to allow greater two-way flexibility, discouraging investors from taking one-way bets on yuan appreciation by bringing speculative capital into the country....But China's central bank still lives in the long shadow of the Asian financial crisis, when sudden outflows of capital brought neighbouring countries to their knees.

Further complicating the picture is the very hard to estimate extent of capital flight which anecdotal evidence suggests is high - "The errors and omissions in China’s balance of payments ($60bn in 2010) suggest tens of billions might be involved in such capital flight though it is difficult to distinguish between hot money outflows and capital flight".  A thorough analysis presented in an interview by Victor Shih, is here.